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Summary  findings
How should countries in transition to market economies  Worse still, the programn  may have delayed
handle the losses of large loss-making enterprises? Over  restructuring by not imposing lhard  budget constraints.
the past six years several governments in transition  Firms included in the program faced softer budget
economies have implemented isolation programs that  constraints than their counterparts  outside the program.
combine features of reorganization under bankruptcy (as  Loss makers were not selected through  objective criteria,
in industrial countries) with severance payments for  and the agency in charge was not sheltered from political
employees and assistance with labor deployment.  pressure in enforcing hard budget constraints.
Djankov analyzes isolation programs for financially  Djankov therefore questions the feasibility of creating
distressed firms in transition economies based on  special programs for enterprise restructuring under
empirical evidence from Romania, the program that had  government auspices, with government agencies
the greatest coverage.  choosing beneficiaries and deciding on the scope of
The results indicate that Romania's isolation program  activity.
fulfilled none of its intentions. Despite substantial costs,  His conclusion supports the insisteince  of internatiotnal
it neither delivered tangible improvements in operational  donor organizations that governments in transition
performance nor improved the process of privatization  economies privatize rapidly, without attempting first to
or liquidation of large loss-making enterprises.  restructure enterprises.
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L.  Introduction
The  transition  to  market  has  changed fundamentally the  relationship between
politicians  and  firms in  former  centrally-planned economies.  In  the  countries  which
pursued  rapid  privatization, the  dependence of  firms  on  the  state  budget  has  been
eliminated.  The  reform  of  the  banking  system  has  hardened  budget  constraints  on
managers who previously enjoyed a close co-operation with their creditors.  Governments
which have pursued reforms less rigorously, however, still finance the losses of many large
state-owned enterprises.  This provides fiscal instability, as evidenced in the 1996 banking
sector collapse in Bulgaria.  What  should governments do to  alleviate the drain on the
state budget?  Can this be handled through the nascent court bankruptcy system? Or is it
necessary to create special programs targeted at the largest loss-makers?  Given the large
number  of  loss-making enterprises  in  transition  economies,  no  previous  comparable
experience exists to provide guidelines for state involvement.
Over  the  last  six  years,  several  governments  in  transition  economies  have
implemented  isolation  programs  for  large  loss-making  state-owned  enterprises.
Theoretically, isolation programs combine features of reorganization under bankruptcy as
developed in industrialized countries, 1 with severance payments for employees and labor
deployment assistance. In this paper, I provide the first empirical evidence on the results of
the Romanian isolation program.  I choose to study the Romanian program since it had the
widest coverage.  I also have financial statements for all firms included in the program, as
well as  extensive  case-study materials prepared  by  foreign  consultants.  The  results
indicate  that  the  isolation  program  did  not  deliver  any  tangible  improvements  in
operational performance, nor did it enhance the process of privatization and liquidation of
large loss-making enterprises.  I also show that firms included in the program faced softer
budget constraints than their comparators outside the program through access to special
funds and  continued  government  subsidies. These  findings question the  feasibility of
creating special programs for enterprise restructuring and privatization under government
auspices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II details the objectives and
components  of the programs  implemented in seven transition  economies.  Section  HI
summarizes  the  Romanian  program.  Section  IV  describes  the  data  and  provides
1  The two  differ significantly,  however,  in that isolation  programs  also aim at changing  the ownership  of
surviving  firms through privatization. In this respect the only  precedent  to the isolation  programs  is the
East German  Treuhandanstalt  which  existed  between  1990  and 1995  with the principal task of privatizing
or liquidating  over 8,000 state-owned  firms, including  two hundred large loss-makers. For evidence  on
the Treuhandanstalt,  see Carlin  and Mayer  (1992)  and Priewe  (1993).
2descriptive  statistics.  Sections V  provides  rigorous  empirical analysis.  Section  VI
concludes.
H. Isolation Programs in Transition Economies
The rationale for isolation programs in transition economies is based on the belief
that  the  emerging bankruptcy  system cannot handle the  large  number of  loss-makers
expediently 2 so as to prevent a drain on the state budget and an associated collapse of the
banking sector.  Countries where such programs were not put in place (Czech Republic,
Hungary, Estonia, Poland)  arguably had  good institutional environment, had privatized
quickly, and had more stable banking systems. Three additional reasons make isolation
programs  attractive  to  politicians. First,  transition  economies  inherited  an  industrial
structure  characterized by  large firms that  frequently employ all of  a town's  working
population and provide many social services (heating, schools, hospitals). Closing such
firms would leave employees with few outside options and may cause political upheaval.
Second,  more transparency in financing loss-makers is achieved, even if firms are still
supported through state funds. Third, downsizing is made easier if all social services are
placed in the hands of the state, and severance pay for workers is provided.
Isolation programs were  implemented in seven transition  economies - Albania,
Armenia, Bulgaria,  Kazakstan,  the  Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia,  and  Romania.  The
programs were designed to cover large loss-making state-owned enterprises. While there
were  some variations across  countries in  the number of  firms and their  selection, all
programs had  similar objectives.  First, the program would force managers of firms to
reduce operational losses without external financial support, to the point where these firms
would generate a positive cash flow.  Second, the program would ensure that firms' losses
were not financed through building up arrears to banks, to suppliers, to the state budget,
and the social security fund.  Third, it would introduce transparency in government policy
by forcing explicit decisions on budgetary support for loss-making enterprises; and policies
designed to  minimize the social impact of reorganization.  Fourth,  the program would
2  Two recent studies  analyze the evidence  on bankruptcy  outcomes  in transition economies. Gray and
Holle (1997) argue that the Polish  bankruptcy  law has several  deficiencies. First, only firms which have
sufficient  assets  to cover procedural  costs can have their reorganization  plans confirmed. This creates a
loophole  for managers - if the firm shows  negative net assets, it is automatically  excluded. Second,  the
order of claimants' preferences  reduces  the incentive  for bank creditors  to initiate bankruptcy  since the
first claimant  is the govermnent,  the second  the employees;  only when  their claims  are satisfied  can other
parties partake in the distribution  of assets. Finally,  creditors  who initiate the bankruptcy  procedure are
asked to pay up to 13% of the value of their claims as advance payment of court fees. For the 23
bankruptcy  cases covered  by the study,  creditors  recovered  only  between  7% to 17%  of their claims. The
procedure also lasted 41  months on  average.  Gray et  al  (1996) study the Hungarian bankruptcy
experience. They conclude  that the bankruptcy  procedures  "did little to further either deep restructuring
or the exit of ailing firms". Of the fifty firms slated  for liquidation,  only one was closed  down within two
years after the initiation  of liquidation.
3place the responsibility of restoring financial discipline  with the firms' management.  Fifth,
the implementation of such a program would send a signal to other state-owned firms that
the  imposition of  hard budget  constraints was closely monitored and  there  would  be
penalties for failure to pursue reorganization.
While under isolation, all overdue debts are frozen until conciliation agreements
with  all creditors  are  concluded.  Arrears  on wages  are  only paid when  firms  have
generated  internally  cash  to  pay  its  employees.  Once  firms  negotiate  conciliation
agreements, they can have some of their debt written off, rescheduled, or swapped for
equity.  If a firm has not reached positive cash flow at the end of the isolation exercise, it
should be liquidated or  privatized.  To alleviate the pressure in shedding access labor,
most programs offered severance packages for workers.  Managers could use this source
to provide up to twelve months of wages to employees who would leave voluntarily.  The
money could also be used for re-training and relocation of workers.
An additional feature of the programs was the establishment of a monitoring unit
which tracked the financial and operational performance of each firm on a monthly basis.
The unit could be part of the newly created agencies for restructuring  (as in Romania,
Albania, Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic), or be based in the Ministry of Finance (Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Kazakstan).  The isolation programs were time-bound - designed to last for
two to four years.  This prevented their "institutionalization", i.e., turning them into state-
run ministries which carried out industrial strategies.  Beyond the program, any firm that
was failing should go through the court bankruptcy procedures. The burden to take such
firms to court would be on their creditors and not the government. 3
III. Description  of the Romanian  Program
In 1992 the Romanian government required a group of loss-making firms to design
diagnostic reports  of their financial situation and operational performance.  The Agency
for  Restructuring  (AR)  was  founded  the  following year  with  the  principal task  of
reorganizing troubled  firms which would be  sheltered from their creditors,  and would
receive  technical  as well  as  financial assistance in  restructuring  their  business.  The
structure included not  only the AR (under the Council for Coordination,  Strategy  and
Economic  Reform)  but  also  the  State  Ownership Fund,  and  the  branch  ministries
responsible for utility firms. Initially about 300 loss makers (accounting for 70% of total
enterprise  losses)  were  targeted.  Under  union  pressure,  however,  the  government
dropped many firms off the list.  Only 73 firms remained in the final draft (April 1994).  In
November  1994, another  74 agricultural farms were  added to  the program.  The total
number of firms increased to  147.  While the  AR had  control  over most  commercial
3  The Romanian  bankruptcy  law  (1995)  is fashioned  after  the German  law which  is creditor-friendly.
Banks  and the state  may  take  a firm to court  if payments  have  been  in arrears  for a specified  length  of
time. Once  the firm files  for bankruptcy,  an outside  trustee  is appointed  to make  decisions  (including
whether  to reorganize  or liquidate).  Sanctions  for  delay  in filing  are  imposed.
4companies and agricultural farms, the State Ownership Fund was given control  over 31
commercial companies, while nine utilities (power, transport, gas) were controlled by the
respective branch ministries. The latter was deemed necessary as utility companies could
not be privatized or liquidated by law, and their employees enjoyed special status.  The
selection resulted in having only 4 of the largest 10 loss-makers, 46 of the largest 100 loss-
makers, and 82 of the largest 300 loss-makers among the state-owned enterprises under
isolation.  The program was thus deficient from its inception as it failed to cover many of
the worst firms - beneficiaries of state funds. This resulted partly from the way it was
perceived by managers - as an enterprise 'sanatorium' rather than a 'jail'. Firms were eager
to join the program because this would give them access to further sources of state funds.
All firms in the reorganization program were required to design financial recovery
plans with technical assistance provided by foreign consultants.  Recovery plans focused
on  short  term  steps to  reduce  expenses. The format  included proposed  restructuring
strategy and expected financial impact of each action as well as detailed profit forecasts.
Firms should be  able to  recover  operating finances through  simple cash management-
tracing  where  the  money was  lost,  who  owed  them  money  - and  collecting  these
receivables diligently. The financial  plans had limited success. Managers were reluctant to
take measures unpopular with the workers because they were  either elected directly by
workers, or else their appointment was approved by the union.  An additional weakness
was the  lack of  managerial knowledge. Managers  were  unable to  assess  their  firms'
financial status because no attention was paid to  such details in their previous work.
When assessing profits, they treated subsidies and production for inventories as revenues.
At the opposite end, when a firm produced goods for its own consumption, they were not
counted as revenues. Not surprisingly, only five of the initial 73 firms suggested measures
to  cut back  production.  The remaining 68  charted  expansionary strategies  based  on
investment and  entry into new  markets,  even though  demand for  their  products  was
rapidly falling.
The  State  Ownership Fund  was  allowed to  lend  money to  enterprises  under
isolation through a special Structural Fund. The Structural Fund was set up to finance (i)
operating  subsidies allocated by the  government; (ii) working  capital to  meet  export
orders;  and (iii) redundancy payments to  employees. The Fund allowed (in theory)  for
transparent allocation of public money to loss-making firms. Any infringement on the rules
would  result  in  the  dismissal of  the  management  team.  The  Romanian  Enterprise
Restructuring Ordinance, for example, stated that "failure to observe measures stipulated
by the programs for restructuring and financial  rehabilitation within the period established,
results in the revocation of manager and the replacement of the Administration Council
members in the case of state companies and in the revocation of managers in case of the
commercial companies."  Redundancy payments were  equal to  6 months  of pay.  This
made it easier to downsize the labor force. For firms that were too politically important to
be  shut  down, this  fund also  helped pay their  utility bills in a  transparent  way.  It
introduced, however, a  softer budget constraint. Firms under isolation gained access to
extra funds, not available  to enterprises outside the program.
5At  the  time  of  closing the  program  (February  1997),  only  four  firms  had
"graduated": two were privatized in 1996, while another two were liquidated.  Another 13
enterprises from the program were closed down by the new government in August, 1997.
This closure was not related to the isolation program, as some other companies (not  on
the isolation list) were also closed.  The program did not have a  significant impact on
managerial turnover: during the implementation of the program only seven (of 147) CEOs
were  fired.  Although these  outcomes were  hardly what the architects of the isolation
program had in mind, perhaps the program was effective in operational turn-around and
eliminating the  dependency  of  isolated firms  on  the  state  budget.  We  consider the
empirical evidence in the following sections.
IV. The Data
I have firm-level data (balance sheet and profit and loss statements) for  1992-96
obtained from the Romanian  Statistical Office.  The  data are annual observations and
cover all firms which were registered as state-owned enterprises in 1992. If some plants
are owned by the same parent company, this relationship is accounted for in the data.
Overall, more than 8,000 enterprises are included. From those,  I  select two  groups of
firms.  The first  set  contains  146 firms from the  isolation program,  identified by firm
numbers - one utility company was excluded from the study for lack of accounting data.
The  second  set  contains  a  control  group  of  146 firms,  matched  one  for  one  with
enterprises in the isolation group. Within each sector, I chose firms in the control group
which had the most  similar size (measured by number of employees), profitability, and
subsidies (as measured by their share in total revenues) in 1992 to corresponding firms in
the  isolation  program.  Firms  come  from  nine  sectors.  This  algorithm  resulted  in  a
distribution of firms across sectors (Table  1) which is identical between the focus and
control groups.  The large share of agricultural firms is due to the inclusion of pig and
poultry farms in the reorganization program in 1994. Although numerous, these firms do
not account for a large part of overall employment.  The largest firms are to be found in
coal mining and utility sectors.
International accounting standards were  not  introduced  in Romania during  the
sample period.  This is  not  a  problem in  the  analysis here which  compares  relative
performance across groups of firms in the same year (period). Several adjustments were
made,  however.  Under  the  Romanian  accounting system, for  example, subsidies and
production  for  inventories are  counted  as  sales.  Since data  on  sales, subsidies,  and
inventory changes are reported in all cases, I recalculate the revenue numbers to  account
for sold (rather than produced) output. Firm-specific output prices are not available.  One
option  is to  use  output  price indices at the  industry  level. This,  however,  limits the
comparisons between firms within the  same sector, given the  likely variation in  their
pricing strategies.  I hence develop the  analysis on the basis of ratios of revenues and
6financing, thus avoiding the need for inflation-accounting, i.e. I use nominal data in both
the numerator and denominator.
I  choose  as indicators of  enterprise restructuring  improvements in  profitability,
labor shedding, reductions in the  debt-to-assets  ratio,  and  reductions in  subsidies and
inventories relative to  sales revenue. The first two  proxy for  operational performance
changes, while the latter three track  hardening of budget constraints.  Table 2 presents
means,  medians and  standard deviations  of key  variables in  the  isolated  and  control
groups.  Sector-specific statistics are reported in Table IA.  Isolated enterprises in the
agricultural sector show rapid deterioration in all five indicators relative to  control group
firms,  while isolated  enterprises  in  the  non-metallic products  sector  show  a  relative
improvement.  Isolated  enterprises in the  other  seven  sectors  also  show  deteriorated
performance relative to their comparators, although this trend is less uniform.
I  first  consider  the  two  indicators  of  operational  performance.  Profitability
(defined as  sales minus wages minus materials expenses over  sales) was  similar across
firms in the two groups  in  1992 - -0.055 and  -0.023 for the focus and  control group
respectively.  By  1996, however,  isolated  enterprises  displayed a  rapidly  worsening
profitability - the ratio declined to -0.358, while control group firms showed only a slight
deterioration  in  performance.  Between  1992  and  1996,  enterprises  under  isolation
reduced their employment by  17.1%, while firms in the control group by 24.1%.  This
difference may be due to firm size - firms in the isolation program were somewhat larger
than firms in the control group. This argument can only be supported if there exists some
rationale for having more constraints to employee reductions in larger firms, e.g., the role
of plant-specific labor unions.  Since labor unions in Romania are industry-specific, not
plant-specific, the difference in labor shedding should not be associated with plant size. I
next exclude the Utilities sector which accounts for much of the difference in size.  The
difference in labor shedding between the two groups remains about the same - 15.4% and
28.3% over the 1992-96 period.
Next  I  study  the  three  indicators  of  financial restructuring.  Indebtedness
(measured by total debt to assets ratio) increased by a third between 1992 and 1996 (from
0.223  to  0.295) for  firms in the isolation program.  Control group  firms experienced
similar deterioration over the sample period (0.206 to  0.262).  I chose total debt as the
numeraire since bank credit was not the major source of financing to loss making firms.
Another financing source was to delay payment for inputs. Overdue payments to suppliers
constitute about 70% of all overdue payments, falling from 73% in 1992 to 58% in 1996
(not reported in Table 2). This suggests that suppliers, not banks, might be source of the
soft budget constraint. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many firms built up arrears to
their energy suppliers-the electric utilities in particular. Utilities in turn  built up  arrears
with their suppliers, the coal mines. Mines were not,  however, the ultimate loser,  since
they enjoyed significant  subsidies through the state budget.
7Direct  subsidies from the  budget  increased  slightly - from  0.054  to  0.077  for
isolated enterprises; and from 0.017 to 0.026 for firms in the control group.  In addition,
isolated firms received structural funds not available to control group firms to the amount
of 0.037 and 0.053 of revenues in 1995 and 1996 respectively.  Thus, transfers from the
budget for isolated firms increased from 5.4% of total revenues in 1992 to close to  12%
by  1996.  The  continuing  deterioration  in  financial performance  can be  seen  in  the
inventory to  sales ratio  that  increased threefold  in the  sample period for  firms in the
isolation  program  - from 0.113  to  0.324.  Firms in the  control group  also  registered
increased inventory build-up albeit to a lesser degree - from 0.114 to 0.257.
These simple descriptive statistics suggest that the isolation program did not result
in  improved operational  or  financial performance. Nor  did it  eliminate (or  even curb)
access to  state funds.  Since these observations are not based on econometric  analysis,
they may be misleading.  In particular, the observed trend may be endogenous  - if the
Romanian  government  selected (with perfect foresight) the worst  loss-makers into  the
program, the results on operational performance would be less surprising. This is unlikely,
however,  since less than half of the worst performing enterprises were  included in the
programs.  The statistics also show lack of hardened budget constraint for enterprises in
the isolation group.  I perform some additional regression analysis in the next section.
V.  Evidence
The description of the Romanian isolation programs in Section III suggests that it
was  adopted  with  three  specific objectives in  mind.  In  particular,  the  program  was
expected to bring (1) reduced  operational losses to  the isolated firms; (2) reductions  in
excess  employment; and (3)  a reduction in government funds allocated to  loss-making
enterprises.  In this section I test if these objectives were achieved.
The sample selection criteria outlined in Section IV allows me to test whether the
performance of firms changed after inclusion in the program.  I employ a matched pair
methodology for comparing pre- and post-inclusion performance of firms.  I also compare
the performance of firms in the isolation program with firms outside the program which
otherwise had similar characteristics. In both cases, I use the Wilcoxon signed-ranked test
as the principal method for hypothesis-testing. 4 If significant changes in the behavior of
firms under isolation did take place, one would expect to  see improved performance both
over time and as compared to the control group of firms that did not participate in the
program.  Since the two groups are of identical size, I can interpret the magnitudes of the
Z-statistics as evidence for smaller (larger) changes in performance.
4 One alternative  method  to compare  changes  over  time  and between  the two  groups  is to perform  T tests
on select  performance  indicators.  This  approach,  however,  is inefficient  when  a large  degree  of  variation
(represented  by high standard deviations  of indicators)  exists in the sample. I also performed  regression
analysis on the main indicators of firm performance  (profitability,  employment  changes).  Since the
results are qualitatively  similar to the findings  using Wilcoxon  sign tests -- no differences  were found in
firm behavior  in the focus  and control  groups  -- they are not reported  here.
8Table 3, Panel A looks at differences across time of enterprises by sector for the
control  and  isolated  groups  separately.  The  differences  are  calculated  using  1996
performance as a benchmark.  A negative Z-statistics on employment, for example, would
mean that the firms have reduced employment between 1992 and 1996.  A positive sign on
profitability would indicate that firms improved their performance during 1992-96. Finally,
a negative sign on subsidies would indicate hardened budget constraints.  In all cases, the
coefficients are statistically significant if they are above 1.96 in absolute magnitude.  Since
agriculture constitutes about half the sample for both  sets of firms, it is possible that  it
drives the  overall result.  I hence  also run the Wilcoxon Test  on all sectors  excluding
agriculture. The results are reported in the next to last row of Table 3, Panel A.
Across  sectors,  in both  the control and the isolation groups, the Wilcoxon  test
statistics indicate that employment was reduced significantly  between 1992 and 1996. The
largest reductions occurred in agriculture - Z-stat of -3.485 and -7.113 for the isolated and
control groups respectively. Although the isolation program resulted in labor shedding, I
show that more drastic labor shedding took  place in firms outside the program, despite
their lack of access to redundancy payments. Profitability went down for both groups: Z-
stats of -4.072 and -0.301 respectively. This decline was driven primarily by the worsening
of the agricultural  sector.  Once agricultural farms were  excluded,  profitability in both
groups actually increased (Z-statistics of 2.148 and 2.718 for isolated and control groups).
Significant positive improvements in profitability were recorded  in three manufacturing
sectors (Non-Metallic Products; Chemicals; Metallurgy) in both groups. This is indicative
of  strong  industry  effects.  Subsidies were  cut  in  all  sectors  with  the  exception  of
agriculture.  Again,  control group  firms were  cut  off from  subsidies more  than their
comparators under isolation - the respective Z-stats are -5.127 and -8.448.
Panel A compares  firm performance in  1996 (the "after"  performance) to  the
"before"  performance in  1992. An alternative method for evaluating performance would
be to compare matched pairs from the isolation and control groups (Panel B). A Wilcoxon
test  statistics  were  computed  for  the  difference in  characteristics  between  pairwise
matched isolation and control group firms in 1992 and 1996. The 1992 comparison shows
that the matching procedure managed to pair firms well. As in Panel A, I use a separate
test on all sectors excluding agriculture. In the last column, I also add structural funds and
subsidies given to isolated firms together to get the total amount of budgetary transfers to
enterprises in the program.
The results in Panel B suggest that isolated enterprises saw a deterioration in their
performance relative to  their  matched comparators.  Relative to  1992, the situation  in
1996 reflects an improvement for the control group in all aspects.  In particular, isolated
firms retained higher employment - Z-stats  of 4.980  in  1996 as compared  to  2.662  in
1992; became less profitable - Z-stats of -4.679 in 1996 as compared to  -1.642 in 1992;
and received more budgetary transfers - Z-stats of 10.524 in 1996 as compared to 7.809 in
1992.  The overall results in all indicators are driven by the inclusion of agriculture.  Once
9this sector is excluded,  the 1992 and 1996 differences  between the two groups become
insignificant  (the Z-statistics  between 1992  and 1996  are about the same). 5
VI. Conclusions
I analyze  the relative performance  of firms selected into the Romanian  isolation
program.  The  empirical evidence shows  that  none  of the  intentions  of  the  isolation
program were fulfilled. Worse  still, the program may have delayed restructuring by not
imposing hardened budget constraint on loss-making enterprises.  The difficulties that the
isolation program faced were due to the selection of enterprises into the program and its
subsequent implementation. Loss makers were not selected on objective criteria, and the
agency in charge was not sheltered from political pressure in enforcing hardened budget
constraints.
On a  more general level, the evidence in this paper questions  the feasibility of
designing programs in which government agencies can decide on the scope of activity and
selection of beneficiaries.  This conclusion is supportive of the insistence of international
donor  organizations that governments in transition economies privatize rapidly, and not
attempt to restructure enterprises prior to privatization.
5 While the isolation program changed little in terms of operational  performance  or drain on the state
budget, its  implementation resulted in  substantial costs. The  operational losses covered by  new
government  subsidies  or loans amount to the equivalent  of 23 months of wages  for all workers in isolated
firms; the costs of maintaining  the program amount to the equivalent  of 5 months of wages;  the cost of
technical assistance  and consulting  services amounts  to an addition  amount of 4 months of wages. Thus
the total opportunity  cost of the Romanian isolation  program can be approximated  to 32 months of wages
for all workers.
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11Table  1: Sample Statistics,  1992
Isolated  Enterprises  Control  Group
SECTOR  Firms  Employment  Sales  Revenues*  Firms  Employment  Sales  Revenues*
Number  %  Number  %  Value  %  Number  %  Number  %  Value  %
Agriculture  70  47.95  49,703  5.70  719.00  9.09  70  47.95  38,343  7.82  148.64  6.16
Coal and Petroleum  5  3.42  192,419  21.65  2,090.00  26.42  5  3.42  138,285  28.23  555.94  23.01
Food  and Beverage  4  2.74  3,278  0.37  17.22  0.22  4  2.74  3,699  0.82  15.63  0.65
Non-metallic  Products  14  9.59  62,461  7.03  909.86  11.50  14  9.59  44,839  9.16  395.62  16.37
Chemicals  12  8.22  39,267  4.42  320.81  4.06  12  8.22  38,811  7.92  391.23  16.19
Metallurgy  12  8.22  103,255  11.62  1,057.49  13.37  12  8.22  84,315  17.21  408.66  16.91
Machines  and Equipment  19  13.01  91,598  10.31  294.42  3.72  19  13.01  82,330  16.81  176.78  7.32
Road Transport  6  4.11  49,026  5.52  177.65  2.25  6  4.11  40,669  8.32  266.34  11.02
Utilities  4  2.74  296,801  33.39  2,323.70  29.38  4  2.74  18,630  3.81  58.27  2.41
All  146  100.00  887,808  100.00  7,910.34  100.00  146  100.00  489,921  100.00  2,416.49  100.00
* In billion Romanian lei.
12Table 2:  Comparison  of Mean  Values
(Mean, Median, Standard Deviation)
All Firms  (146  Observations  Each)  Excluding  Unilities  and Road  Transport
Indicator  Isolated  Enterprises  Control  Group  Isolated  Enterprises  Control  Group
1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996
Profitability  -0.055  -0.358  -0.023  -0.086  -0.079  -0.434  -0.031  -0.079
0.019  -0.117  0.036  0.017  0.022  -0.122  0.041  0.017
0.331  0.618  0.296  0.405  0.434  0.742  0.307  0.392
Employment  6331  5252  3752  2848  4134  3498  3581  2567
1598  1099  1426  743  1151  927  1244  661
19504  15982  8176  6599  8639  8302  8317  6344
Debt  to Asset Ratio  0.223  0.295  0.206  0.262  0.219  0.301  0.205  0.268
0.200  0.257  0.179  0.224  0.203  0.267  0.183  0.241
0.128  0.153  0.117  0.199  0.134  0.152  0.121  0.202
Subsidies  to Sales  0.054  0.077  0.017  0.030  0.054  0.076  0.013  0.026
Ratio*  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.000
0.091  0.119  0.068  0.082  0.088  0.111  0.056  0.065
Inventory  to Sales  0.113  0.324  0.114  0.257  0.134  0.354  0.122  0.2262
Ratio  0.027  0.204  0.036  0.162  0.028  0.203  0.044  0.167
0.214  0.367  0.202  0.306  0.316  0.406  0.202  0.308
Notes: * Excluding structural funds for isolated enterprises.
13Table 3: Comparison of Performance Changes,  1992-96*
SECTOR  Panel A. Comparison  over  Time within Each Group (Z Statistics  using a Wilcoxon  Signed  Ranked  Test)
Changes  for Isolated  Enterprises,  1992-96**  Changes  for Control  Group, 1992-96**
Employment  Profitability  Subsidies  Employment  Profitability  Subsidies
Agriculture  -3.485  -6.633  4.861  -7.113  -3.128  -6.342
Coal  and Petroleum  -0.944  -0.944  -1.213  -1.753  -1.213  -2.023
Food  and Beverage  -1.826  -0.731  0.731  -1.826  -0.365  -0.367
Non-Metallic  Products  -2.919  1.977  -3.290  -2.981  2.668  -3.296
Chemicals  -3.059  2.510  -1.412  -2.903  2.588  -0.476
Metallurgy  -2.981  2.197  -3.059  -3.059  2.510  -3.059
Machinery  and Equipment  -3.461  0.885  -3.823  -3.823  0.885  -3.823
Road Transport  -2.201  -0.314  -2.201  -0.943  -1.782  -2.201
Utilities  -0.730  -1.095  0.000  -0.365  -0.365  -0.732
Excluding  Agriculture  -6.549  2.148  -3.422  -6.580  2.718  -5.679
All Enterprises  -7.594  -4.072  -5.127  -9.562  -0.301  -8.448
Panel B. Comparison  between  the Isolation  and Control  Groups (Z Statistics  using a Wilcoxon  Signed  Ranked
Test for Matched  Pairs of Firms)
Differences  between  Means, 1992***  Differences  between  Means, 1996***
(The second  Subsidies  column  includes  structural  funds)
Employment  Profitability  Subsidies  Employment  Profitability  Subsidies
Agriculture  1.766  -1.103  5.898  4.901  -4.552  5.047 11.124
CoalandPetroleum  1.483  0.535  0.535  1.483  -0.405  1.214  2.314
Food  and Beverage  -0.730  0.783  0.535  -0.365  -1.095  1.826  2.476
Non-Metallic  Products  1.601  -1.363  3.180  1.475  -0.220  2.417  3.765
Chemicals  -0.078  -0.392  1.647  -1.961  -0.078  2.118  2.889
Metallurgy  2.275  -0.314  3.059  2.353  -1.726  2.122  2.441
Machinery  and Equipment  2.455  -1.167  3.823  2.696  -0.845  2.334  2.875
Road  Transport  0.105  -1.082  2.201  -0.105  0.734  0.314  1.096
Utilities  1.826  0.365  0.365  1.826  -0.365  0.730  1.435
Excluding  Agriculture  4.044  -1.357  5.499  3.479  -1.434  4.623  1.987
All Enterprises  2.662  -1.642  7.809  4.980  -4.679  6.511 10.524
Notes:  * The cut-off  point  of significance  at the 95% level for Z-stats  is 1.96  ** 1992  taken as the benchmark;  ***  Control  Group  taken as the benchmark.
14Table 1A: By-Sector Comparisons
(Mean, Median, Standard Deviation)
Isolated  Enterprises  Control  Group  Isolated  Enterprises  Control  Group  Isolated  Enterprises J  Control  Group
1992  1996  |  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996
Agriculture  Coal  and Petroleum  Food  and Beverage
Profitability  0.048  -0.632  0.094  -0.112  0.047  -0.309  0.008  -0.294  -0.314  -0.692  -0.168  -0.207
(0.116)  -(0.433)  (0.113)  (0.008)  (0.090)  (0.178)  (0.045)  (-0.087)  (-0.300)  -(0.925)  (-0.304)  -(0.159)
0.308  0.693  0.245  0.433  0.425  0.962  0.204  0.875  0.562  0.557  0.369  0.578
Employment  736  667  613  345  38097  36265  29621  24349  849  536  1008  624
(518)  (415)  (451)  (222)  (33124)  (27312)  (29500)  (21460)  (686)  (408)  (446)  (381)
1152  1012  483  337  18971  19816  13879  14155  712  430  1202  604
Debt to AssetRatio  0.250  1334  0.186  0.264  0.178  0.246  0.179  0.336  0.432  0.319  0.276  0.196
(0.227)  .287)  (0.165)  (0.217)  (0.162)  (0.235)  (0.163)  (0.294)  (0.284)  (0.286)  (0.296)  (0.211)
0.13.  '!8  0.131  0.253  0.081  0.135  0.091  0.162  0.389  0.150  0.104  0.097
Subsidies  to Sales  0.0.  0.122  0.008  0.044  0.171  0.267  0.067  0.106  0.112  0.068  0.073  0.001
Ratio  (0.034j  (0.112)  (0.000)  (0.025)  (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.114)  (0.070)  (0.000)  (0.000)
0.067  0.085  0.028  0.063  0.192  0.339  0.152  0.233  0.105  0.048  0.142  0.002
Inventory  to Sales  0.041  0.471  0.051  0.337  0.051  0.082  0.054  0.144  0.263  0.315  0.309  0.296
Ratio  (0.004)  (0.288)  (0.000)  (0.189)  (0.050)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.047)  (0.026)  (0.297)  (0.148)  (0.284)
0.169  0.448  0.178  0.384  0.054  0.144  0.062  0.346  0.495  0.330  0.436  0.306
(continued)
15Isolated  Enterprises  Control  group  Isolated  Enterprises  Control  group  Isolated  Enterprises  Control  group
1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996
Non-Metallic  products  Chemicals  Metallurgy
Profitability  -0.258  -0.061  -0.291  -0.086  -0.050  0.038  -0.058  0.056  -0.302  -0.083  -0.248  0.033
-(0.258)  (0.025)  -(0.246)  (0.029)  -(0.037)  (0.075)  -(0.042)  (0.048)  -(0.248)  -(0.031)  -(0.226)  (0.061)
0.254  0.209  0.324  0.294  0.150  0.149  0.148  0.122  0.343  0.242  0.239  0.116
Employment  4895  3759  3884  2627  3593  2461  3316  2948  8885  7822  8126  6044
(4580)  (2555)  (3577)  (2361)  (2324)  (1393)  (2810)  (2482)  (5594)  (3565)  (2649)  (2257)
2052  2609  1695  1037  2189  1946  1898  1687  10086  10113  15388  11035
Debt to Asset Ratio  0.257  0.312  0.268  0.336  0.219  0.293  0.200  0.264  0.159  0.252  0.247  0.296
(0.253)  (0.314)  (0.266)  (0.334)  (0.187)  (0.304)  (0.186)  (0.243)  (0.150)  (0.246)  (0.203)  (0.278)
0.093  0.126  0.132  0.152  0.097  0.112  0.074  0.108  0.083  0.099  0.126  0.135
Subsidies  to Sales  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.097  0.000  0.054  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Ratio  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.056)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.113  0.000  0.124  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
InventorytoSales  0.180  0.164  0.208  0.212  0.115  0.229  0.127  0.114  0.175  0.211  0.167  0.112
Ratio  (0.166)  (0.114)  (0.189)  (0.162)  (0.102)  (0.055)  (0.119)  (0.092)  (0.155)  (0.162)  (0.137)  (0.078)
0.124  0.157  0.117  0.223  0.073  0.504  0.076  0.064  0.106  0.205  0.126  0.089
(continued)
16Isolated  Enterprises  Control  group  Isolated  Enterprises  Control  group  Isolated  Enterprises  Control  group
1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996  1992  1996
Machinery  and Equipment  Road  Transport  Utillties
Profitability  -0.147  -0.042  -0.128  0.033  0.028  0.007  0.116  -0.113  0.025  -0.405  0.020  -0.264
-(0.037)  -(0.044)  (-0.035)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.030)  (0.125)  (-0.011)  -(0.046)  -(0.130)  (-0.052)  (-0.012)
0.367  0.239  0.368  0.179  0.139  0.176  0.119  0.234  0.179  0.820  0.172  0.927
Employment  5186  3673  5315  2955  8492  6449  7041  7854  77849  63024  4622  4822
(3126)  (2461)  (2463)  (1778)  (7919)  (6155)  (4179)  (4179)  (58865)  (52680)  (969)  (544)
4688  3538  9207  4447  6235  4726  4609  9656  88967  67924  7609  8908
Debt  to Asset Ratio  0.171  0.221  0.194  0.225  0.267  0.278  0.187  0.246  0.070  0.104  0.079  0.104
(0.152)  (0.226)  (0.167)  (0.232)  (0.183)  (0.257)  (0.199)  (0.175)  (0.082)  (0.111)  (0.062)  (0.068)
0.091  0.132  0.083  0.094  0.262  0.159  0.069  0.193  0.050  0.067  0.056  0.083
Subsidies  to Sales  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.148  0.273  0.186  0.199
Ratio  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.106)  (0.223)  (0.140)  (0.084)
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.166  0.270  0.223  0.298
Inventory  to Sales  0.329  0.279  0.262  0.206  0.079  0.226  0.031  0.227  0.000  0.008  0.002  0.098
Ratio  (0.193)  (0.271)  (0.182)  (0.216)  (0.100)  (0.215)  (0.028)  (0.191)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.000)
0.337  0.196  0.303  0.146  0.060  0.102  0.030  0.196  0.000  0.007  0.006  0.187
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